Abstract. Remote user authentication is important to identify whether communicating parties are genuine and trustworthy using the password and the smart card between a login user and a remote server. A number of password-based authentication schemes using smart cards have been proposed in recent years. We find that two most recent password-based authentication schemes (Hsiang and Shih 2009, Chen and Huang 2010) assume that the attacker cannot extract the secret information of the smart card. However, in reality, the authors in (Kocher et al. 1999 and Messerges et al. 2002) show that the secrets stored in the card can be extracted by monitoring its power consumption. Therefore, these schemes fail to resist smart card security breach. As the main contribution of this paper, a robust remote user authentication scheme against smart card security breach is presented, while keeping the merits of the well-known smart card based authentication schemes.
Introduction
With the significant advances in communication networks over the last couple of decades, remote user authentication based on passwords [7, 10, 14, 17] or biometrics [15, 16] over insecure networks is the conventional method of authentication and has already been accepted warmly. Typically a network of remote servers are responsible for managing and supplying network services to login users for which user authentication protocols have been provided during a login procedure.
In 1981, Lamport [14] first proposed a remote user authentication scheme, remote server maintains verification tables and authenticates the validity of a login user by verifying his/her identity and password. However, it is ineffective for remote server to maintain the verification tables due to the size of the verification tables are proportional to the number of login users. Therefore, in 1998, Jan and Chen [10] proposed a password authentication scheme without maintaining verification tables in the system. In 2000, Hwang and Li [7] proposed a remote authentication scheme using smart cards based on ElGamal's [6] public-key cryptosystem, remote server only keeping one secret key and no maintained verification tables required. Without storing verification tables in servers, it may prevent possible stolen-verifier problems. However, in contrast to a hashing function based cryptography such as SHA-1 [19] , the main disadvantage of a public-key based cryptography is high computational cost and more inefficient to implement. Due to the power constraint of the smart cards, Sun [23] proposed an enhanced version of Hwang-Li's authentication scheme based on use of a lightweight hashing function. However, in Sun's scheme, a login user cannot freely choose the password he/she wants. That is, the design in Sun's scheme is actually unrealistic and lack of user friendliness. In 2002, Chien et al. proposed a friendly user authentication scheme [5] , allowing users to freely choose passwords and providing mutual authentication between login user and remote server. However, in 2004, Hsu pointed out that Chien et al.'s scheme is vulnerable to parallel session attacks [9] and the attacker can replay a legal user's previous login message to pass server's authentication. In 2005, Chen and Yeh proposed an efficient nonce-based authentication scheme with session key agreement [2] . In contrast to timestampbased approaches, nonce-based approaches prevent serious time synchronization problems. Moreover, in Chen-Yeh's authentication scheme, a common session key will be agreed for securing later communi-A ROBUST REMOTE USER AUTHENTICATION SCHEME USING SMART CARD cations after the authentication phase. In 2008, Juang et al. [11] proposed a user authentication and key agreement scheme using smart cards based on elliptic curve cryptosystems [12] and can prevent insider attack. However, Sun et al. [24] found that Juang et al.'s scheme is vulnerable to session-key problem, inability of password-update operation and inefficiency of double secret keys. Recently, Liao et al. [18] proposed nine requirements for rating performance of a new password authentication scheme in terms of security, friendliness and efficiency. A new password authentication scheme using smart cards should satisfy the following requirements: (1) without maintaining verification tables; (2) users can freely choose and update passwords; (3) resistance to password disclosure to the server; (4) prevention of masquerade attacks; (5) resistance to replay, modification, parallel session and stolen-verifier attacks; (6) a easy-to-remember password; (7) low communication cost and computation complexity; (8) achieve mutual authentication between login users and remote servers; (9) resistance to guessing attacks even if the smart card is lost or stolen by attackers. Besides requirements stated in reference [18] , we list four additional requirements to solve all problems in smart card-based authentication schemes, including: (10) session key agreement; (11) revocation of smart card; (12) resistance to insider attacks; (13) prevention of smart card security breach attacks. For Requirement (13) , it is important to note that secret information stored in a smart card can be extracted by analyzing and monitoring its power consumption [13, 20] . Obviously, if a legal user's smart is lost and it is picked up by a malicious attacker or an attacker steals user's smart card, the user's sensitive password may be derived out by an attacker. After that, there is no way to prevent the attacker from masquerading as the legal user. To the best of our knowledge, we find that until now no smart-card-oriented authentication schemes can resist smart card security breach attacks. In this paper, we focus on the security of password authentication schemes for the merit that the design scheme achieves Requirement (13) and we will propose a robust remote user authentication scheme with better security strength while keeping the above-mentioned requirements.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 is a brief review of one related authentication scheme and we analyze two schemes to show their security weaknesses in Section 3. The new remote user authentication scheme against smart card security breach is proposed in Section 4. Our proposed scheme is compared with other related works in Section 5 and Section 6 concludes the paper.
Review of Related Works
A number of password-based remote authentication scheme using smart cards have been proposed in recent years. In this section, we review two most recent password-based remote authentication schemes [4, 8] . For convenience of description, we will list the common notations used throughout this paper in Table 1. In the very beginning of two remote authentication schemes, the login user U i chooses his/her identity ID i and password P W i , and the remote server S holds a master secret key X, which is kept secret and only known by the server.
A Review of Hsiang and Shih's scheme
Hsiang and Shih proposed an improved version of Yoon et al.'s remote user authentication scheme [25] and Hsiang and Shih's scheme [8] is composed of three phases, registration, authentication and password update.
Registration Phase
The registration phase consists of two steps:
} to the remote authentication server S, where b is a random number.
If it is U i 's initial registration, the server S creates an entry for U i and records N = 0 in the account database. Otherwise,
and V = H(P ⊕H(P W i )) and stores V , R, and H(·) into the smart card SC i , where EID = (ID||N ). Finally, S releases SC i to U i and the registration phase is completed after U i stores b into SC i .
Authentication Phase
When U i wants to login to the server, U i performs the following operations and the authentication phase consists of two steps.
The user U i enters ID i and P W i and the smart card
Upon receiving the login request, S verifies the validity of T U i . If it is invalid, S rejects 
Password Update Phase
In this phase, U i enters his/her identity ID i , the original password P W i , and the new password
A Review of Chen and Huang's scheme
In 2010, Chen and Huang proposed a userparticipation-based authentication scheme [4] that benefits from combining CAPTCHA (Completely Automated Public Turing Test to Tell Computers and Humans Apart) [22] and visual secret sharing [21] . Chen and Huang's authentication scheme is composed of three phases, registration, authentication and password update.
Registration Phase
This phase is to issue a smart card SC i to the login user U i and the transmitted messages in this phase is over a secure channel. The registration phase consists of two steps:
User U i computes H(P W i ⊕n) and submits ID i and H(P W i ⊕ n) to the remote authentication server S, where n is an initial nonce.
and the registration phase is completed after U i stores n into SC i .
Authentication Phase
If user U i wants to login to the server, U i should first insert his/her SC i into a card reader and enters the identity ID i and password P W i . Then, SC i should do the following operations and the authentication phase consists of three steps.
User U i generates a visual secret sharing image S 1 and a random number R 1 and computes 
Password Update Phase
In this phase, the user U i can change the original password P W i to the new password P W i any time he/she wants. First, U i enters ID i , P W i and new password
and replaces C 1 with C 1 .
The Various Kinds of Attacks with Smart Card Security Breach
In this section, we show some attacks with smart card security breach in two authentication schemes [4, 8] and we assume that an attacker U A may have the capabilities shown in Table 2 . Let us consider the following scenarios. If a user's smart card is lost and it is picked up by an attacker or an attacker steals user's smart card. The secrets stored in the smart card can be extracted by monitoring its power consumption [13, 20] , then the attacker can easily derive user's password and masquerade as a legitimate user.
Off-line Password Guessing Attack

Cryptanalysis of Hsiang and Shih's Scheme
Similarly, according to C-2 (ii) of Table 2 , in Hsiang and Shih's scheme [8] , the attacker U A can breach the secrets Step 1. Select a guessed password P W * i .
Step
Step 3.
Step 4. Compare V to V .
A match in Step 4 above indicates the correct guess of user's password. Therefore, U A succeeds to guess the low-entropy password P W i and Hsiang and Shih's scheme is also vulnerable to off-line password guessing attack.
Cryptanalysis of Chen and Huang's Scheme
According to C-3 of Table 2 , in Chen and Huang's scheme [4] , the attacker U A breaches the secrets
, n and H(·) are stored in the smart card and eavesdrops the messages E C2⊕R1 (S 1 ), R 1 and H(S 1 ||R 1 ||C 2 ). Then, the attacker can use the breached secrets C 1 , n and H(·) and the eavesdropped messages E C 2 ⊕R 1 (S 1 ), R 1 and H(S 1 ||R 1 ||C 2 ) to perform the following steps:
Step 1. Select a guessed password P W * i .
Step 2. Compute H(P W
Step 4.
Step 5.
A match in Step 5 above indicates the correct guess of user's password. Therefore, the attacker U A succeeds to guess the low-entropy password P W i and Chen and Huang's scheme cannot resist off-line password guessing attack.
Masquerading Attack
Once the attacker U A has correctly derived the user's password P W i , he/she can also use the stored information on the stolen or lost smart card to forge a valid login request to masquerade as a legal user. Table 2 . An attacker has the following capabilities of doing security attacks C-1 The attacker UA has total control over the communication channel between U i and S such as eavesdropping, intercepting, inserting, deleting, and modifying any transmitted messages in the public channel. C-2 The attacker may either (i) obtain U i 's P W i , or (ii) extract the secret information of the smart card, but cannot achieve both (i) and (ii). C-3 We focus on the security of authentication schemes for the case that the attacker has Capabilities C-1 and C-2 (ii).
Cryptanalysis of Hsiang and Shih's Scheme
Similarly, during the authentication phase of Hsiang and Shih's scheme, the attacker U A can use the information on the lost or stolen smart card to make a valid login request to masquerade as a legal user with ease. For example, U A is able to compute C *
by using the current timestamp T U A and the derived password P W * i on the lost or stolen smart card. Hence, U A can successful make a valid login request message to masquerade as a legal user U i by sending {ID i , T U A , C * 2 } to the server S.
Cryptanalysis of Chen and Huang's Scheme
The detailed description of this attack is as follows. Firstly, during the authentication phase of Chen and Huang's scheme, the attacker U A generates a visual secret sharing image S * 1 and a random number R *
.
Then, U A can use the information on the lost or stolen smart card to make a valid login request to masquerade as a legal user with ease. For example, U A is able to compute C *
) by using the derived password P W * i on the lost or stolen smart card. Thus, U A can successful make a valid login request message to masquerade as a legal user U i by send-
2 )} to the server S.
The Proposed Scheme
In this section, we describe a robust remote user authentication scheme which resolves all the above security flaws of smart card security breach. In general, some remote user authentication schemes consists of registration, authentication, and password update phase. In our proposed we divide the authentication phase into the login and verification phase. Thus, our scheme consists of registration, login, verification, password update, and smart card revocation phases. Figure 1 shows the entire protocol structure of the new user authentication scheme. 
where the 1st field of AT records the user's identity, the 2nd field of AT records N = 0 if it is U i 's initial registration, otherwise, S sets N = N + 1 in the existing field for U i , and the 3rd field records U i 's verification parameter H(H(P W i ⊕ RN 1 )) for a later login request. 
Finally, S computes C 1 = H(ID i ||X||N ) ⊕ H(H(P W
i
The Login Phase
When U i wants to login S, the following operations will perform: 2 U i inserts his/her SC i into the smart card reader
User Server
Registration Phase:
Login Phase: Fig. 1 . Proposed user authentication scheme and enters ID i , P W i and a new random number RN 2 , where RN 2 is used for next login request. Then, SC i generates a random number RC and computes 6 SC i sends {ID i , C 4 , C 6 } over a public communication channel to the remote server S.
The Verification Phase
Upon receiving the login request from U i , the remote server S and the smart card SC i performs the following operations: 
, which equals to
Then, S replaces the third entry H(H(P W
and sends E K S (RC, RS, C 5 ) over a public communication channel to the smart card SC i , where RS is a random number generated by S and K S = H(C 7 ||C 8 ). Finally, the format of AT is shown as follows:
Upon receiving the message from S, SC i computes symmetric key 
Password Update Phase
This phase is extremely similar to the login and verification phases of the proposed scheme and U i is strongly recommended not to use any previous parameters for his/her update request, e.g. random number RN 2 . When a user U i wants to update his/her password P W i with a new password P W i , U i inserts his/her SC i into the smart card and enters his/her ID i , the original password P W i , the new password P W i , and a new random number RN 3 
Finally, SC i sends {ID i , C 4 , C 6 } over a public communication channel to the remote server S. Upon receiving the message, S performs Step (V.1) and finally the format of AT is shown as follows:
User Registration Verification identity times parameter
Note that the new password P W i and the new random number RN 3 stored in S's AT are simultaneous updated. Moreover, SC i replaces original RN 2 and C 1 with new RN 3 and C 3 ⊕ C 5 , respectively. Now, the new password P W i and the new random number RN 3 are successfully updated and this phase is terminated.
Smart Card Revocation Phase
In case of stolen or lost smart card, invalid user may impersonate a legal registered user to login into the remote server by using the login parameters stored in the stolen or lost smart card. As a result, there should be provision in the scheme for revoking the illegal use of stolen or lost smart card. U i notified the remote server of the revocation and S verified the validity of U i by checking his/her personal credentials, e.g. national ID card. If U i is legal, U i generates a new password P W i " and a new random number RN 4 and performs the same steps of the registration phase. That is, the value of N is incremented by one and the format of AT is shown as follows:
Note that U i can re-register to S without changing his/her ID i . Finally, S releases the new smart card SC i to U i and U i stores RN 4 into SC i and this phase is finished.
Analysis of The Proposed Scheme
The proposed authentication scheme benefits from the protection of smart cards to prevent the secret information for an attacker to steal and guess the real secrets stored in the stolen smart card or in the exchange of authentication messages. In the following subsections, we give an in-depth analysis of the proposed scheme in terms of security and functionality properties.
Security Analysis
Proposition 1. The present scheme is secure against off-line password guessing attack with smart card security breach.
Proof. With the assumption that the attacker has Capabilities C-1 -having collecting the transmitted mes-
Throughout the proposed scheme, U i 's password P W i makes four appearances as
However, for each new login request, the previous random number RN i stored in the smart card have to be replaced with new random number RN i+1 . Therefore, an attacker cannot launch off-line password guessing attack without knowing the previous secret RN i and our proposed authentication scheme can resist offline password guessing attack with smart card security breach.
Proposition 2. The proposed scheme can withstand masquerade attack with smart card security breach. Proof. As is described in Table 2 of Section 3, let us assume an attacker U A has extracted smart card's secrets and has got the transmitted messages between U i and S. U A inserts U i 's SC i into the card reader and then enters the guessing password P W * i and a random number RN * i . As described above, throughout the proposed scheme, if any trial value of the password is used, U A has only one chance to guess the original password to pass server's validation. Once U A 's guessing password is wrong, the server can immediately detect the validity of fake login request and terminate U A 's login session. In this case, U A cannot masquerade as a legal user to send a valid login request message and the masquerade attack cannot work in the proposed scheme. (1)
In
Step (L.2) of the login phase, after B receives the login request {A, (1) and (2) are satisfied, and together they accomplish the mutual authentication and dynamic session key agreement in the proposed scheme. Proof. In order to verify the validity of login user, the server may maintain some verification or password tables in its database. However, the server is always targets of malicious attacks and the malicious insider U A may obtain the server's verification table. Thus, U A can try to impersonate the legal user to access any remote server. In the registration phase of the proposed scheme, a legal user U i only sends his/her identity ID i and H(H(P W i ⊕ RN i )) to S, that is, P W i will not be revealed to S. Besides, in the login phase, a user is required to submit 
, our scheme can withstand the stolen-verifier and insider attack. Proof. An legal user U i may try to derive the server's master secret key X from (ID i ||X||N ) . In fact, due to it is computationally infeasible to invert the one-way hashing function and S's secret key is assumed to be 256 bits, this attack will fail and any kind of server secret key guessing attack will not occur in our proposed scheme.
Functionality Analysis
In this subsection, the functionality comparisons among related authentication schemes and our proposed scheme are summarized in Table 3 . From Table 3, it is clear that our proposed scheme satisfies all the security and functionality requirements, with particular focus on smart card security breach. To the best of our knowledge, until now no smart card based user authentication scheme that can simultaneously resist smart card security breach and eavesdropping attack has been proposed. Among these vulnerabilities, these schemes [1-5, 8, 18, 23] are insecure against the password guessing and masquerade attacks with smart card security breach. After the attacker collects the login request message during one of the past sessions of a login user, with the secrets stored in the stolen smart card, the attacker can derive the user's password by launching an off-line guessing attack. Moreover, the attacker can use the derived password to masquerade as legal user to access the resources of the remote server. We observe that the key point to prevent proposed weakness is to provide user password verification in server side not in user side. Thus, the attacker cannot use the secret information stored in the stolen smart card to launch off-line password-guessing attacks. Once the password verification is done by the remote server, the remote server must maintain some secrets for verifying the validity of login user, and this design may suffer from stolenverifier or insider attacks. The key of attacking succeed is what kind of information revealed from the stolen verification table. In the proposed scheme, user password P W i is mixed with a random number RN i to form the verifier V = H(H(P W i ⊕ RN i )) and then stored in the server side. If the malicious insider is able to steal the verifier V from the server, he/she still cannot derive P W i , RN i and H(P W i ⊕ RN i ) from V , in which is mainly based on the protection of one-way property of H(·).
On the other hand, in case of a legal user's smart card is lost or stolen by the attacker, he/she can notify the remote server to revoke his/her smart card. In the proposed scheme, it provides a functionality for revoking the illegal use of lost or stolen smart card.
Conclusions
This paper proposed a robust user authentication scheme using smart cards. We have showed that the proposed scheme avoids smart card security breach attacks and maintains the merits of related works such as provision of mutual authentication, prevention of password guessing attack, detection of masquerade attack, session key agreement, and so on. In our future works, a formal security proof and a experimental simulation would have been a better picture to demonstrate the feasibility of the proposed scheme and the proposed scheme can be further extended with the countermeasure against the Denialof-Service (DoS) attacks. 
